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We explore the dynamics of limited attention in the $35 billion market for checking 
overdrafts, using survey content as shocks to the salience of overdraft fees. Conditional 
on selection into surveys, individuals who face overdraft-related questions are less likely 
to incur a fee in the survey month. Taking multiple overdraft surveys builds a “stock” of 
attention that reduces overdrafts for up to two years. The effects are significant among 
consumers with lower education and financial literacy. Consumers avoid overdrafts not 
by increasing balances but by making fewer debit transactions and cancelling automatic 
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Does limited attention hinder consumers from acquiring and using readily available 
information when making financial decisions? If yes, how does consumer attention respond to 
shocks and evolve over time? Answering these questions is critical for understanding how people 
make financial tradeoffs and for designing sound public policy in retail financial markets. In this 
paper we explore the role and dynamics of limited consumer attention in the payment of 
checking account overdraft fees, broadly defining limited attention as incomplete consideration 
of elements and/or prices in one’s choice set. 
Checking account overdraft fees are an important dimension of bank pricing, but they have 
been largely unstudied by economists. U.S. consumers spend an estimated $35 billion annually 
on fees charged for initiating transactions that would put their account balance in negative 
territory, an amount greater than what they spend on fresh fruit or large appliances (Parrish 
2009). Over the course of the 2000s, banks have relied increasingly heavily on overdraft fees, 
with such fees reaching an estimated 74% of revenue from deposit account service charges and 
6% of net operating revenue in recent years (Burrhouse et al. 2008).  
The growing importance of overdraft fees has generated considerable controversy and policy 
scrutiny. Consumer groups allege that overdraft fees are poorly disclosed, exploitative, and 
disproportionately paid by the poor and uneducated.
1 This sentiment has led to lawsuits and new 
regulations. Recent audits and class-action lawsuits allege violations of disclosure and fair-
dealing laws.
2 The Federal Reserve Board recently issued new rules that require banks to secure 
consumer opt-in to standard overdraft coverage on debit card and ATM transactions.
3 Many 
banks have modified their overdraft policies in the wake of these events, and some industry 
observers conjecture that these changes could fundamentally alter how banks price deposit 
account services.
4 Understanding why people overdraw their accounts is crucial for optimal 
policy design, and to date, we know very little about that. 
To shed light on these issues we examine data from thousands of consumers’ checking 
accounts, covering up to three years of complete account activity. The data are collected by a 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., http://www.consumerfed.org/financial-services/credit-and-debt/overdraft-loans. We discuss relationships 
between disclosure, other information, and attention below 
2 On disclosure violations, see, e.g., General Accounting Office (2008). On class action suits, see, e.g., 
http://www.bank-overdraft.com/. 
3 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_overdraft.htm for a summary geared to consumers. 
4 See, e.g., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703513604575311093932315142.html. 3 
 
market research firm that pays panelists for permission to access their accounts. For every 
account in the data we observe the full set of transactions, account balances, and all fees incurred 
on the account, including overdraft fees. 
We then ask how overdrafting is affected by shocks to customers’ attention. Limited 
attention seems to be a plausible and potentially important explanation for some overdrafts. To 
cite three motivating patterns (see Section II-D for more), our prior work finds that many 
overdraft fees are avoidable without forgoing consumption and with small changes in behavior; 
for example, many consumers could avoid paying overdraft fees by using a credit card instead of 
a debit card at the point of sale (Stango and Zinman 2009), trading a $35 overdraft fee for just a 
few pennies in credit card interest. There is also survey evidence that most people overdraw 
accounts because they “thought there was enough money in my account.” Finally, panelists 
frequently come close to the margin of overdrafting: among panelists who ever overdrew an 
account in our sample period, an overdraft occurs in 31% of panelist-months  - but available 
balances fall below $100 in 83% of all panelist-months. These descriptive statistics are consistent 
with (though not proof of) an important link between attention to account balances and 
overdrafting. 
Our measure of attention comes from online survey questions answered by panelists.
5 The 
market research firm invites all panelists to take surveys periodically. All of the surveys have 
something to do with household financial services, but specific topics and questions vary from 
survey to survey. Topics/questions are not announced before a consumer chooses to take a 
survey. Most surveys do not contain overdraft-related questions (we call these “generic” 
surveys). But a handful of surveys plausibly draw consumers’ attention to overdraft fees by 
asking questions about overdraft fee payment, use of overdraft protection programs, or 
(dis)satisfaction with overdraft fees. We label these surveys “overdraft-related.” Most of the 
overdraft-related surveys convey relatively little information in the traditional sense: the 
questions do not describe specific account terms faced by panelists, and with one exception, 
overdraft-related questions represent less than 5% of the total survey. The exception is an 
“overdraft-focused” survey that asks a series of overdraft-related questions and little else, but 
even that survey provides no consumer-specific information about account terms. All surveys are 
administered online, so we observe questions exactly as panelists observe them. 
                                                 
5 There are large literatures on how surveys and other “primes” can affect behavior, and we discuss these below. 4 
 
In DellaVigna’s taxonomy (2009, p. 349), overdraft-related surveys may increase the 
salience of overdraft fees and may therefore affect consumers’ effort to acquire and/or use 
overdraft-related information. For example, an overdraft-related survey might induce a 
respondent to monitor account balances more closely, to increase balances with a buffer, and/or 
to reduce spending.  
Conditional on selection into surveys, panelist fixed effects, and time-varying sample-wide 
shifts in the propensity to incur overdraft charges, we find that taking an overdraft-related survey 
has a substantial immediate effect on behavior: within the month of the survey, taking an 
overdraft-related survey reduces the probability of incurring any overdraft fee by an estimated 
3.7 percentage points on a base of 30%. There is weak evidence that overdrafting is positively 
related to selection into survey-taking overall, meaning that selection into surveys may attenuate 
the effect of taking an overdraft-related survey.  
We also find evidence of a strong stock effect: each overdraft-related survey taken within a 
two-year period reduces the probability of paying an overdraft fee by 1.7 percentage points.
6 
Again, this is a within-individual effect and conditional on the timing and number of surveys 
taken. Selection into survey-taking also attenuates this effect: there is a positive relationship 
between the number of generic surveys taken and incurring overdraft fees. 
Overall, the immediate and stock effects of overdraft-related surveys are strong for those 
with lower education, lower financial literacy, and lower income, and are not statistically 
significant for those with higher education or higher financial literacy.
7 We do not find 
significant effects on the intensive margin (e.g., total dollar value of fees incurred) of overdrafts, 
suggesting that attention has a relatively discrete effect on overdrafting. 
Additional light on the mechanics and dynamics of attention comes from more detailed 
exploration of relationships between survey content and overdraft behavior. As we mention 
above, one of the surveys focuses exclusively on overdrafts (in contrast, overdraft questions 
never comprise more than 5% of the other surveys). The stock effect of taking the “overdraft-
focused” survey is significantly greater than the stock effect of taking the more subtle “overdraft-
mentioning” surveys. We also find significant effects on overdrafts of non-overdraft questions 
                                                 
6 A model in which stock effects last for two years outperforms, in terms of fit and robustness, a model with one-
year stock effects or permanent (non-depreciating) effects (see Section IV-B for details). 
7 We measure financial literacy using responses to a question from a survey consumers complete when they are 
registering their accounts in the panel: "I know more than most people when it comes to managing my money and 
investments [agree/disagree/neutral]." 5 
 
about spending control, monitoring account balances, and other bank fees. We find no such 
relationships for a set of “placebo” questions about auto loans, gift cards, or contactless RFID 
cards.  
Panelists who take overdraft-related surveys engineer reductions in overdraft fees by 
reducing spending transactions. There is some evidence they do this both at high and low 
frequencies: we see significant reductions in both debit cards and recurring “autodebit” 
transactions. That pattern suggests that reductions occur on transactions where the balance-at-
clearing is difficult to monitor/forecast. There is little evidence that panelists avoid overdrafts by 
maintaining higher account balances. The full picture of results is consistent with consumers 
responding to attention shocks by paying greater attention to account balances.  
In all, our results suggest that consumers have a limited, time-varying, associative and 
malleable stock of attention paid to day-to-day household finance. Surveys can operate as shocks 
to attention, changing behavior and outcomes. Repeated shocks to attention cause sustained 
changes in behavior that depreciate fairly slowly. 
Our results provide the first evidence from a U.S. setting that being surveyed per se changes 
subjects’ subsequent behavior, and are consistent with other work on survey-taking and decision-
making.
8 Zwane et al. (2011) show that being surveyed about health and household finances 
increases the subsequent purchase of insurance and use of water purification. This follows a 
large literature showing that asking subjects more directly about their intent or likelihood of 
engaging in a targeted behavior changes that behavior (Dholakia 2010). A literature on priming 
and other context effects suggests that small changes in economically irrelevant stimuli can have 
substantial, and long-lasting, effects on consumer choice, at least in the lab (Chartrand et al. 
2008; Sela and Shiv 2009; LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Belyavsky Bayuk 2010).
9 
Our results also add to a growing body of evidence pointing to an important role for limited 
attention in household finance and other domains (see DellaVigna 2009 for a review).
10 They 
                                                 
8 If surveys change behavior, this raises ethical and methodological issues about relying on surveys to measure 
behavior and elicit behavioral parameters. We distinguish between being surveyed per se, about topics related to the 
target behaviors of interest, and being asked more directly about the target behavior of interest, in the sense of 
questions that are administered by a party with a vested interest in the target behavior (e.g., a firm selling the product 
under study), and/or questions that ask respondents about their intent or likelihood of engaging in the target 
behavior. See Zwane et al. (2011) for discussions of the evidence on how surveys affect behavior. 
9 Persuasive advertising is an important application of priming effects; e.g., Bertrand et al. (2010) find that small 
changes in uninformative ad content have large effects on the take-up of expensive consumer loans. 
10 See also and Lee and Malmendier (2010) for new theory and empirics on limited attention in auctions, Lacetera et 
al. (2010) on limited attention in the car market, Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch (1991), Eliaz and Spiegler (2011), 6 
 
provide the first clear evidence we know of on the dynamics of limited attention.
11 
Understanding those dynamics is critical, because while we have prior evidence that attention 
influences decisions, we know very little about how attention accumulates and decays. 
Some caveats apply. Our sample is not representative along some dimensions. The external 
validity of our estimated treatment effects is uncertain. We lack the statistical power to cleanly 
benchmark our effects to other types of information and/or attention shocks such as a prior 
overdraft.
12 While we identify significant average treatment effects, it is likely that both attention 
and the treatment effects vary significantly across individuals. Perhaps most important, we 
caution against taking welfare implications from our results. We cannot say, for example, 
whether consumers pay too little or too much attention in the absence of shocks.
13 We do not 
observe whether attention to other matters falls when attention to overdrafts rises. In all, it would 
be imprudent to draw conclusions about the welfare effects of public policy, overdraft-related or 
other, from our findings. 
What we do hope for is further inquiry, because understanding the role of limited attention in 
financial decisions is a necessary step toward designing sound public policy in household 
finance. Much of the recent policy discussion regarding overdrafts, and consumer financial 
protection more generally, revolves around mandated disclosure of account terms that firms 
might “shroud” absent regulation.
14 The central issue there is whether providing consumers with 
more information helps them to make better decisions. A model of limited attention suggests a 
different question: can reminders or other shocks to attention, even if they are uninformative in 
the classic sense, help consumers make better decisions?
15 And are ongoing reminders more 
effective than (or a useful complement to) one-shot, upfront disclosure? Understanding the 
empirical importance of limited attention can frame and sharpen that policy discussion. We 
discuss these points further in the Conclusion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Koszegi and Szeidl (2011) on consideration sets, and Karlan et al.  (2011) on how reminders affect saving 
behavior. 
11 Agarwal et al.’s(2008) evidence on the dynamics of credit card penalty fee payment is similar but may have more 
to do with the effects of information rather than attention, since the shock that changes behavior in their setup is 
actually incurring a fee. 
12 Overdrafting is strongly serially correlated in our data; see Section III-C. 
13 Barber and Odean (2008) describe how news may create buy-side pressure on stocks, leading to losses for 
investors who buy them. 
14 See Government Accountability Office (2008) for a topical discussion of overdraft disclosure regulation. Gabaix 
and Laibson (2006) provide an equilibrium model of shrouding in which firms fail to disclose account terms and 
exploit uninformed customers. 
15  See Grubb (2011) for a model of inattention and a discussion of policy remedies. 7 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the overdraft market. Section III 
describes our data and empirical strategy. Section IV presents our main results. Section V 
presents results on behavior behind those main results, i.e., on how consumers achieve 
reductions in overdraft fees. Section VI provides a conceptual framework and some evidence on 
the cognitive mechanics underlying our results. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Checking Overdraft Fees: Background and Public Policy 
A. Overdrafts and Bank Policies 
An overdraft occurs when a customer initiates a transaction that would bring the account 
balance below zero. Consumers can overdraw an account by making ATM withdrawals, writing 
checks, or using a debit card. Automated withdrawals can also generate overdrafts.
16 
When an overdraft occurs, a bank can pay or decline the transaction according to the 
overdraft policy in the customer’s checking account agreement. The agreement specifies both the 
manner in which overdrafts are paid and any overdraft or nonsufficient fund (NSF) fees that an 
overdraft will incur. Banks sometimes call this policy “bounce protection” because by paying the 
transaction, the bank helps the customer avoid bounced check fees charged by merchants; we 
will follow more recent usage and refer to this as “standard overdraft service.”
17 Standard 
overdraft service policy generally grants banks complete discretion over whether to pay or 
decline a particular overdraft. Banks typically will pay overdraft transactions up to an internally 
specified limit on the account balance and decline any transactions exceeding the limit; the limit 
protects the bank against default by customers who never bring balances back into positive 
territory.
18 
The most common standard overdraft service pays overdrafts up to the internal limit and 
charges a fixed per-transaction overdraft fee ranging from $20-35.
19 Some banks charge NSF or 
“return item” fees for transactions they decline to pay. Some also charge daily “negative balance 
                                                 
16 A Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) report (Burrhouse et al. 2008) provides an extensive description 
of bank overdraft pricing and policies, and we draw heavily on that report here. 
17 The Federal Reserve uses “overdraft service.” See http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm 
under Regulation E. 
18 The internal limit varies across banks, across customers within banks, and even for a given customer over time. 
Most large banks use fraud/default protection software similar to that used by credit card companies; if a particular 
account displays suspicious behavior, or behavior suggesting a high likelihood that the customer plans to default on 
the negative balance, the bank will start to decline overdraft transactions. 
19 See reports by the FDIC (Burrhouse et al. 2008), the Government Accountability Office (2008), and others. 8 
 
fees” of $2-5 while the account balance remains negative and/or charge interest on the 
overdrawn amount.  
Another type of overdraft policy is “overdraft protection,” which links the customer’s 
checking account to another account or source of liquidity such as a credit card. When the 
customer overdraws the account, the bank charges the overdraft amount to the linked account or 
credit card and also often charges a transfer fee and/or interest on the overdrawn balance. 
Transfer fees are typically $5 or $10, but the fee may depend on the amount overdrawn. 
Most banks post overdraft fees and account balances daily and show them as debits on 
checking account statements. Many banks mail (or e-mail) customers notification about 
overdrafts; those typically reach customers within a few days after the overdraft. More recently, 
some banks (and third parties) have begun marketing balance-monitoring and other messaging 
services that, e.g., send an account holder a text message and/or e-mail when the account balance 
falls below a pre-specified threshold. 
Customers choose an overdraft program when opening an account, and can change their 
overdraft program at any time, or choose to not have overdrafts paid by the bank at all. Most 
deposit account agreements “default in” customers to standard overdraft service (Burrhouse et al. 
2008; Center for Responsible Lending 2010). National surveys produce a broad range of 
estimates of the prevalence of accounts with overdraft protection: from 16 percent (Burrhouse et 
al 2008) to roughly 40 percent (Parrish 2008; Center for Responsible Lending 2009). 
 
B.  Overdraft Prevalence and Importance 
Overdraft fees have become common in recent years as banks shifted from a pricing model 
based primarily on monthly fees (see, e.g., Stavins (1999)) to one based primarily on fees for 
service (ATM fees, overdraft fees). The FDIC (Burrhouse et al. 2008) and industry analysts such 
as Moebs document this transition and find that overdraft revenue rose to about 75% of explicit 
deposit account revenue and 6% of total net operating revenue in recent years. That explicit 
revenue has become more important to bank income statements in recent years. 
Industry reports estimate that annual overdraft fees paid are roughly $30-40 billion. Roughly 
speaking, this averages $150 per year per checking account. There are limited customer-level 
data on overdrafting, and most are self-reported (American Bankers Association 2007; 
Burrhouse et al. 2008; Parrish 2008; Center for Responsible Lending 2009). It is possible that 9 
 
customers under-report their own overdrafting; such under-reporting has been documented for 
other types of unsecured borrowing (e.g., see Zinman (2009) on credit card debt). Thus, 
examining administrative data, as we do, is important for understanding how consumers behave. 
 
C. Controversy and Public Policy Regarding Overdrafts 
In recent years bank overdraft practices have become controversial. Consumer groups allege 
that many banks fail to effectively disclose both the terms of their overdraft programs and the 
choices that customers face (Government Accountability Office 2008). Complaints also note that 
many transactions triggering overdraft fees are quite small; if a $4 cup of coffee generates a $35 
overdraft fee, the argument goes, then the customer has been exploited.
20 Consumer advocates 
also argue that overdraft fees disproportionately affect the poor. Finally, the practice of many 
large banks to batch-process transactions daily, clearing and settling them in order from highest 
to lowest dollar amount, has also proven controversial, because it increases the total number of 
overdraft fees assessed. 
The Federal Reserve Board recently required banks to secure affirmative consumer 
permission (i.e., an active opt-in) to pay overdrafts and charge accompanying fees on most debit 
card and ATM transactions.
21 Another recent regulation requires banks to more prominently 
disclose overdraft fees that a customer has paid in any periodic statements issued to that 
customer.
22 Some recent proposals would require banks to notify customers at the point of sale 
when an overdraft is about to occur. 
We do not take a stance on this controversy, except to note that it highlights the need to 
understand more about the reasons that consumers overdraw their accounts. The merits of more 
complete up-front disclosure, for example, are greater if poor up-front disclosure generates 
overdrafts, but they may be negligible if poor up-front disclosure is not a driving force behind 
overdrafts. More generally, it is difficult to assess the merits of any particular policy given what 




                                                 
20See, e.g., http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/quick-facts-on-overdraft-loans.html  
21 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_overdraft.htm for a summary geared toward consumers. 
22  12 CFR Part 230 [Regulation DD; Docket no. R-1315], effective January 1, 2010. 10 
 
D. Limited Attention and Overdrafting 
A variety of economic and psychological models can generate overdrafts. 
In a purely neoclassical, full-information model, a checking account holder will pay an 
overdraft fee due to some combination of motives to ease liquidity constraints and/or economize 
on transaction costs. It can be perfectly rational to pay a $34 fee to ensure that a $20 transaction 
can be completed, if the marginal utility from that transaction is worth at least $54 in utility 
terms, and cheaper sources of liquidity are not available (where “cheap” includes transaction 
costs, broadly defined). We do not attempt to rule out this sort of traditionally rational 
explanation for overdrafting; indeed, the overdraft-focused survey in this panel finds that a 
substantial fraction of customers express a willingness to pay a $35 overdraft fee even on very 
small transactions. 
Limited attention also might play a role in overdrafting. Our view of what limited attention 
means is quite general: we take it to mean incomplete consideration of information that would 
inform choices, whether that information is about account terms or available balances. Our 
definition encompasses that of Grubb (2011), who takes inattention to mean consumers are 
unaware of their own past account usage (implying uncertainty about available balances in our 
setting). In both Grubb’s definition and ours, a consumer with limited attention will be uncertain 
about the marginal price associated with a transaction that might overdraw the account. 
Occasional overdrafting is a natural consequence of such uncertainty. 
Survey evidence suggests that limited attention is a plausible explanation for overdrafting. In 
one survey question answered by panelists taking the “overdraft-focused” survey studied below 
(see Section III-E), 60% of overdrafters report overdrafting because they “thought there was 
enough money in my account.” Most of the remainder report that “the money I deposited was not 
yet available.” Both reasons are consistent with limited attention to checking account balances. 
There is also evidence of limited attention to account terms. In that same survey, 24 percent of 
checking account holders did not know/remember whether the bank described different overdraft 
coverage options at the time of account opening. In two other nationally representative surveys, 
12 and 13% of checking account holders report not knowing whether they currently have 
overdraft protection on their checking account (Parrish 2008; Center for Responsible Lending 
2009).  11 
 
Descriptive evidence from administrative data is also consistent with limited attention as a 
reason for overdrafts. Consumers could avoid many overdraft fees by tapping readily available 
sources of liquidity (Stango and Zinman 2009). One conservative measure classifies a fee as 
avoidable if the overdraft amount is exceeded by the minimum available liquidity in another bank 
account or credit card during the month of that overdraft. Under this measure, among consumers 
with both a checking account and a credit card, over 50% of overdraft fees are avoidable. 
If answering overdraft-related survey questions makes overdraft fees more salient and 
thereby turns the customer’s attention to overdrafting, it could in turn affect the frequency of 
overdrafting even if the survey does not provide information per se. For example, getting asked a 
question like: “Do you have overdraft protection?” could remind someone about the opportunity 
to enroll in such a program. Alternatively, that or another overdraft-related question could induce 
the customer to monitor balances more closely, to make purchases with a credit card when 
balances are low, to keep a higher buffer stock of balances in the account, to cut back on 
spending generally, or to do several of these things simultaneously. 
In short, limited attention is a plausible explanation for overdrafting, and it is also plausible 




A.  Overview of Panel Creation and Data Content 
Our data come from Lightspeed Research (formerly Forrester Research). Panelists in our 
sample are members of the “Ultimate Consumer Panel,” which is one of many such panels 
maintained by Forrester/Lightspeed.
23 
Panelists enter the Ultimate sample by providing Lightspeed with access to at least two 
online bank accounts (checking, credit card, savings, loan or time deposit) held within the 
household. Panelists have typically participated in other Forrester/Lightspeed panels; the 
incremental payment for enrolling in the Ultimate panel averages $20. After initial enrollment 
panelists need take no action to maintain membership in the panel, and a panelist may request to 
                                                 
23 Other Forrester/Lightspeed panels track consumer behavior of interest to market researchers, such as the use and 
purchases of new technology. Those panels are widely used by industry researchers and academics; see, e..g,   
Goolsbee  (2000; 2001), Kolko (2010), and Prince (2008). 12 
 
leave the panel at any time. Enrollment of new panelists occurs consistently throughout our 
sample period, as Lightspeed attempts to keep panel size constant by balancing enrollment 
against attrition. 
In addition to the account data, Lightspeed collects survey data on Ultimate panelists. All 
panelists complete a short online registration survey when they sign-up for the panel; this gives 
us some baseline information on demographics, financial characteristics, and respondent-
assessed financial literacy. Once in the panel, panelists are then invited to take online surveys 
that are offered periodically. Survey topics are not preannounced, and we use variation in survey 
content to identify attention shocks. 
 
B. Details on Account/Transaction Data 
The checking account data collected by Lightspeed have two main components. The first 
component is transaction-level and comes from monthly checking (and credit card) account 
statements. The statements contain every accounting debit and credit to the account: check 
deposits and withdrawals, debit card purchases, ATM deposits/withdrawals, automated 
clearinghouse (ACH) debits and credits such as bill payments and PayPal transactions, transfers 
to/from other accounts, and so on. Every fee on the account is also recorded as an accounting 
debit (or credit, if the fee is refunded). For every transaction we observe whether it is a debit or 
credit, the transaction date, and the transaction amount. Other critical information comes from a 
set of text strings that identify the bank (“BANK OF AMERICA ALL EXCEPT CA, WA & ID), 
account name (e.g., “MYACCESS CHECKING5266”) and transaction description. The last 
string is most important for our purposes, as it nearly always contains information about the 
payment medium, payee/payer, merchant, location, and so on. We use that text string to identify 
transaction types, fees in general and overdraft fees in particular. An example of a debit card 
transaction description is this: “CHECKCARD 0607 QUIZNO'S SUB #6431 Q54 
HARRISONVILLEMO 2432…” The string therefore indicates payment method, merchant, store 
ID (#6341) and location (Harrisonville, MO). That is in addition to transaction amount, bank, 
account name, and date. A typical overdraft fee transaction description looks like this: 
“WITHDRAWALS/D OVERDRAFT FEE, 25.00.” A fee associated with a linked account might 
look like this: “OVERDRAFT XFER FROM CREDIT CARD OR LINE.” We use a text 13 
 
substring identification routine to classify transaction types and fees. While we can generally 
distinguish between standard overdraft fees and fees related to overdraft protection, we cannot 
distinguish between accounts with overdraft protection and accounts with standard overdraft 
service. We discuss the implication of this limitation below.
24 
  A second component of account data is a near-daily running “available” and “current” 
account balance.
25 Lightspeed obtains these data by logging in and “scraping” the consumer’s 
account between three and seven times per week. These running balances provide a relatively 
complete picture of the funds available in the account on a day-to-day basis. 
 
C. Panelists and Overdrafting in Our Sample 
The sub-sample of panelists we examine here are those with at least one “active” bank 
checking account. An active account is one with at least one transaction that could generate an 
overdraft fee (i.e., an accounting debit) during our sample period. For most of our panelists, the 
checking account in the Lightspeed data seems to be the only one held by the panelist: roughly 
95% of our panelists report holding only one open checking account in their registration survey. 
An observation in the raw administrative data is a panelist-transaction, but for this paper we 
aggregate to the panelist-month. We do this because while we observe transactions and fees on a 
day-by-day basis, our identifying variation in shocks to attention exists only at the monthly level 
(we know only the month, not the day/time, that someone took a survey). Table 1 shows 
summary data on panelists in our sample. The administrative data cover 2006-2008; we report on 
the month-years Feb-06 to Dec-08, inclusive.
26 We observe a total of 7,448 panelists with an 
active checking account, and 102,334 panelist-months of data; Appendix Table A1 provides 
more information on the time series of participation in the panel month-by-month.
27 
                                                 
24 The central problem is that we observe fees only when they are incurred. Thus, an account with no fees (or a 
period without fees) may have either standard overdraft service or overdraft protection. It is also difficult to use fees 
paid to infer what overdraft service a customer has. For example, the majority of accounts in which an overdraft 
protection fee has been incurred later incur a standard overdraft fee – presumably because the linked account has 
been depleted or hit its limit. 
25 The available balance is what the consumer may withdraw before overdrafting. The current balance is the 
available balance plus holds on the account and netting out pending debits/credits. 
26 We observe transactions in January 2006, but we do not use those data in the empirical work because we often 
condition on lagged monthly information – which is first available as of Feb-06. 
27 This table shows that sample composition changes over time.  Section IV-F discusses how we control for this. 14 
 
Of our active panelists, roughly half incur at least one overdraft fee during the sample (Table 
1). We define an overdraft fee as any explicit pecuniary cost associated with a negative account 
balance. Thus, this definition includes the $20-35 fee associated with standard overdraft service. 
It also includes fees associated with returned items, linked accounts, and so on. In our data, the 
most common fee by far is the standard overdraft fee, but we include others for completeness. 
Across all panelist-months, the share with at least one overdraft fee is 16%. That number is 
naturally higher (31%) among panelists who pay at least one overdraft fee in our data. 
Overdrafting itself is not uncommon, and being close to the margin of overdrafting is extremely 
common: 72% of all panelist-months show at least one available balance below $100, and that 
figure is higher (83%) among panelists with at least one in-sample overdraft fee. It is worth 
noting that even panelists who never overdraw in-sample often have low balances: among non-
overdrafters, balances fall below $100 in a full 56% of all panelist-months. This is prima facie 
evidence of systematic variation across customers in attention paid to balances; it is not simply 
the case that non-overdrafters never face the prospect of overdrafting. 
Roughly 15% of all panelists, and 28% of those with at least one overdraft, have at least one 
“snowball” month with five or more overdraft fees. Three percent of all panelist-months are 
snowball months, and that number rises to 6% among those who have ever overdrawn an 
account. 
There is substantial heterogeneity across panelists and months in the frequency of 
overdrafting and the dollar amount of fees paid. Figures A1 and A2 illustrate that heterogeneity. 
While roughly half of all panelists never overdraw in our data, a substantial share of panelists 
serially overdraw (Figure A1). Two percent of panelists who overdraw do so at least once in 
every month. Dollar amounts of overdraft fees charged are similarly skewed. As Figure A2 
shows, there are modes at levels representing integer multiples of common overdraft fees ($25-
30, $50-60, $80-100, and so on). But in roughly 8% of cases with at least one overdraft fee, the 
total dollar value of fees exceeds $250, and in numerous panelist-months total overdraft fees 
exceed $500. 
There is also a very strong month-to-month correlation in overdraft fees, within-panelist. The 
last three rows of Table 1 illustrate this. Fifty-four percent of panelists who incur overdraft fees 15 
 
in a given month do so again in the next month. Eighty-one percent of panelists who incur 5+ 
fees incur at least one in the following month. 
D. Details on Registration Survey 
Along with collecting the administrative data (which is done passively from the panelist’s 
perspective), Lightspeed also actively solicits survey information from its panelists. All panelists 
complete a “registration survey” at the time of enrollment covering demographics, household 
financial assets/liabilities (such as stock market participation, the number of credit cards held, 
etc.), and attitudes in household finance and other domains. In the empirics below we use data on 
three panelist characteristics collected at registration: education, income, and financial literacy. 
All are self-reported and categorical. We do not observe these variables for every panelist, 
because panelists register at different times and registration survey questions change over time. 
We measure literacy using the response to: “I know more than most people when it comes to 
managing my money and investments,” using “agree” as an indicator of high self-assessed 
financial literacy, and “neutral” and “disagree” as indicators of medium/low literacy. The 
correlation between “disagree” (i.e., rating oneself below average) and credit score is -0.15, in 
the subsample of panelists for whom we also observe credit scores.
28 The correlation between 
rating oneself above average and credit score is 0.17. 
Table A2 shows simple relationships between education/literacy/income and overdrafting 
and also provides information about representativeness along these dimensions. At the panelist 
level, those with higher education and financial literacy incur overdraft fees less often; the 
relationship between income and incurring fees is weaker. Our sample is drawn from those with 
higher income and education on average.  
 
E. Details on Periodic Surveys 
Lightspeed also periodically gives panelists opportunities to complete additional surveys on 
financial product use and satisfaction. Invitations are sent via e-mail to all panelists, and survey 
respondents are compensated by being entered into a prize lottery. Figure 1 shows the click-
through screen that a panelist sees before taking a survey; for our purposes it is important to note 
                                                 
28 We use the self-assessed literacy measure rather than credit score because we observe the latter only for a small 
subsample of panelists. 16 
 
that the click-through screen reveals nothing about survey content (overdraft-related vs. non-
overdraft-related). Lightspeed classifies any respondent who clicks through as having taken the 
survey. 
We have complete data on survey taking, content and responses for our panelists starting in 
August 2004 (the date of the first survey) and continuing to the end of 2008. The survey data 
predate our administrative data, so that even in the first month of administrative data we have 
comprehensive information for each panelist on past surveys administered and taken. We 
observe survey content and responses for 21 surveys overall. We observe the month in which the 
survey is administered, but not the precise date of administration. Table 2 shows each month in 
which a periodic survey was offered and also shows information about survey content. Response 
rates are typically in the 20-30% range for the 2006-2008 surveys.
29 We cannot measure 
response rates for the pre-2006 surveys, because we lack the administrative data that would give 
us the total number of panelists.  
Content of the periodic surveys varies and provides the identifying variation in attention that 
we exploit in our empirical work. Each survey contains roughly 60 multiple choice/response 
questions. Many of the questions appear on nearly every survey and ask panelists to report the 
types of bank accounts they hold (credit cards, checking, savings etc.), and the bank(s) and/or 
credit card companies with which they do business. Many surveys also ask questions about usage 
of credit cards vs. debit cards. Some surveys collect attitudinal information about borrowing and 
saving. Some are more narrowly focused (say, on different loans held by the panelist, including 
amounts and repayment behavior). Some focus on panelists’ use of or willingness to adopt new 
financial products (such as “contactless cards” that use RFID technology).  
Most important for our purposes, six of the surveys ask “overdraft-related” questions. Table 
2 summarizes which surveys asked overdraft-related questions, and Table A3 panel A shows the 
overdraft-related questions themselves. Some surveys ask whether panelists have overdraft 
protection. Some ask whether overdraft fees are a source of “dissatisfaction” with the panelist’s 
current bank. We classify any survey containing at least one question referring to overdraft fees 
or protection as “overdraft-related.” 
                                                 
29 Response rates across surveys vary for several reasons. The set of panelists varies over time and may introduce 
differences in average panelist-level propensity for taking surveys. Some surveys are left “open” online longer than 
others. And there are small variations from survey to survey in prizes/compensation for participating. 17 
 
In five out of the six overdraft surveys, the overdraft-related questions make up a small 
fraction of total questions on the survey: never more than 5%, and typically closer to 1%. None 
of the questions on these surveys mentions specific fee amounts or defines overdraft protection 
(i.e., outside options to standard overdraft services are not described in detail). We label these 
surveys as “overdraft-mentioning” surveys. 
The other overdraft survey is what we call “overdraft-focused.” The October 2006 survey 
was commissioned by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), a consumer advocacy group 
that lobbies on overdraft policy, and 12 of the 15 questions mention overdrafts. Table A3 panel B 
lists the questions, which ask both about actual behavior and about consumers’ preferences (e.g., 
to have banks pay or decline overdrafts by default). While this survey does provide some 
information on prices and outside options, none of that information is customer-specific. 
For estimating the relationship between overdrafting and having taken overdraft-related 
surveys, the empirical ideal would be random assignment into overdraft-related surveys. Our 
identifying assumption, given that panelists consciously decide whether to take a survey when 
confronted with the click-through screen, is that conditional on a panelist’s decision to take a 
survey, the survey content is random. Support for this assumption comes from the click-through 
screen (Figure 1), which contains no information about survey content. Coupled with the 
irregular intervals at which surveys mention overdrafts (see Table 2), it is unlikely that panelists 
are able to consciously select into overdraft-related surveys. We do allow for selection into 
surveys overall in the empirical work and find some support for selection bias along that 
dimension. 
We also find no statistical evidence that consumer-level characteristics are correlated with 
taking overdraft-specific surveys, once we condition on the total number of surveys taken (Table 
A4, column 2). Table A4 shows the results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable 
is the count of overdraft-related surveys taken. The RHS variables are panelist demographics and 
variables measuring how long a panelist is in the panel. Without controlling for the total number 
of surveys taken, the panelist demographics are significant in explaining variation in overdraft 
surveys (p-value=0.00), but when we condition on the total number of surveys taken, that 
correlation disappears (p-value=0.69). Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that customer 
characteristics are unrelated to selection into overdraft surveys conditional on the propensity to 
take any survey. 18 
 
Table 2 also classifies surveys based on other content that is plausibly related to overdrafting 
behavior, particularly if attention is driven in part by salience that works in an associative way. 
Some surveys ask about spending control, monitoring checking balances or other non-overdraft 
fees. We explore the role of this survey content in the empirical work below.
30 The table also 
classifies surveys based on other content that appears at similar frequencies to overdraft 
questions but is plausibly unrelated to overdrafting behavior: contactless (RFID) cards, gift cards 
and auto loans. Below we use these variables for a robustness check and a form of placebo test 
on our main results. 
Table 3 tabulates panelist-level data summarizing total and overdraft-related surveys taken. 
Only 30% of panelists never take any survey. Another 30% take one or two surveys. Twenty-
seven percent of panelists take at least one overdraft-related survey, and 16% take more than 
one. The data therefore display substantial variation across and within panelists in both total and 
overdraft surveys taken; the within-panelist variation in surveys taken and survey content drives 
our empirics. 
 
F. Advantages and Limitations of the Data 
The Lightspeed data are unique (to our knowledge) in three important respects. First, the 
account and transaction data span multiple banks. Some recent work in household finance 
employs administrative transaction-level data, but typically only from a single provider.
31 
Second, our data link administrative measures of actual behavior to a rich set of panelist 
characteristics collected in the registration survey. Third, Lightspeed matches its administrative 
data with periodic surveys regarding consumer behavior, preferences and other attitudes. 
The main disadvantage of the Lightspeed data is that they are not nationally representative. 
The requirement that panelists register accounts online selects relatively educated and higher-
income people.
32 Panelists are necessarily those who are comfortable sharing sensitive financial 
                                                 
30 Example of spending control question: “I like being in control of my spending [agree/disagree scale].” Example of 
balance-monitoring question: “How often do you log into your [Q1 BANK] banking website specifically to look at 
your account balance?” Example of other fee question: “Debit cards have too many fees associated with them 
[agree/disagree scale].” 
31 The study by Agarwal et al. (2009) is a nice exception, drawing on administrative data from multiple financial 
institutions. 
32 We do not report the results, but our sample is also younger than average, and higher-income and more-educated 
even conditional on age. 19 
 
information (in exchange for the compensation they get for participating), although nearly all 
household surveys on consumer finance face a similar selection issue. Most of our panelists 
manage other aspects of their finances online. It is also worth noting that the distribution of our 
self-reported financial literacy measure is roughly centered on average, and even tilted a bit 
toward below average. This is somewhat surprising given other evidence that people tend to self-
assess (too) favorably in household finance (Lusardi and Tufano 2009)
33 and related domains 
such as stock-picking (Glaser, Weber, and Langer 2010). 
These representativeness issues are worth noting, but it is equally important to note that they 
predict nothing about the central representativeness question here, which relates to possible 
heterogeneity in comparative statics: do our panelists respond more or less to shocks that might 
affect attention paid to daily household finance? We are not aware of any evidence, theoretical or 
empirical, that produces sharp priors. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results 
A. Model and Identification 
The research question is whether shocks to attention affect overdrafting, in both the short run 
and over sustained periods. Our empirical model approaches that question by estimating the 
relationship between overdrafting and within-panelist variation in overdraft surveys taken. The 
unit of observation is a panelist-month, because we observe only the month in which a survey 
was administered. 
 
The primary estimating equation is:
34 
AnyODit  1TookODit  2ODSurveys_Last2yrsit
3TookAnyit  AnySurveysit
4AnyODi,t1  5Snowballi.t1 i  t  it
 
We estimate the model with OLS, and cluster standard errors on panelist.
35 The dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to one if panelist i incurs at least one overdraft fee in month t. This 
                                                 
33 Lusardi and Tufano’s estimates in their Table 4 suggest that only 13% of the U.S. population rate themselves as 
having below-average overall financial knowledge. 
34 The model also includes a dummy equal to one if the month is the panelist’s last in the sample. We typically 
observe transactions for only part of the month in such instances, meaning that overdrafts are less common. 20 
 
specification models attention as operating on the extensive margin (“does the panelist 
overdraw?”) rather than the intensive margin (“how many overdrafts, or how much in fees 
paid?”). We also examine the intensive margin below; to preview those results, we find little 
evidence of a relationship between overdraft survey-taking and the intensive margin. 
The model estimates both short- and long-run relationships between overdrafting and having 
taken overdraft-related surveys. The contemporaneous variable TookOD it equals one if the 
panelist took an overdraft survey in the current month and measures the “immediate” effect. The 
variable ODSurveys_Last2yrsit measures the total number of overdraft-related surveys taken in 
the last two years. This variable increases with survey-taking and falls over time as overdraft-
related surveys recede into the past for a panelist. It specifies what one can think of as a “stock” 
of attention that builds with survey-taking and decays over time. Below we present results from 
models with shorter- and longer-horizon specifications of the stock effect and more flexible 
functional forms on the relationship between the stock variable and overdrafting. The survey 
stock variable increments by one in the month after taking a survey, in order to cleanly 
distinguish the stock effects from the immediate effects.  
We control for selection into surveys generally by including a contemporaneous indicator 
TookAnyit equal to one if the panelist took any survey, including an overdraft-related survey, in 
the current month. Thus, the coefficient on TookAnyit measures the relationship between 
selection into surveys and overdrafting (along with any causal effect of survey-taking generally), 
and the coefficient on TookOD it measures the incremental effect of taking an overdraft-related 
survey relative to taking any survey.  AnySurveys it is a set of indicators for the total number of 
surveys taken. These control flexibly for longer-run selection in surveys: secular trends or 
dynamics in the dependent variable that are associated with taking surveys or with taking 
multiple surveys. 
The other controls are fixed month/year effects and fixed panelist effects.
36 Some models 
also include a lagged dependent variable  AnyODi,t1 measuring overdrafting in the previous 
month, and a variable Snowball i.t1 equal to one if the panelist incurred five or more overdraft 
                                                                                                                                                             
35 Within survey months there is variation in survey-taking; in one month, we have variation in survey-taking and 
survey content, because both an overdraft-related and a generic survey were offered. 
36 We have also estimated specifications including leads of overdraft-survey and any-survey taking; these variables 
tend to be insignificant and do not change the results. 21 
 
fees in the previous month.
37 Both variables are intended to capture the autocorrelation in 
overdrafting summarized in Table 1, although their inclusion does not change the results.
38  
Because we rely on within-panelist variation in survey-taking to identify the model, our 
econometric analysis excludes panelists with no variation in the dependent variable. We exclude 
the 48% of panelists who never overdraw their accounts, and the 1% of panelists who overdraw 
every month. 
Our identifying assumption is that conditional on the right-hand-side variables there are no 
differential unobserved secular dynamics in the dependent variable across those who take 
overdraft-related surveys and those who do not take overdraft-related surveys. Under that 
assumption our estimate of the causal stock effect of taking overdraft-related surveys is the 
ODSurveys_Last2yrsit coefficient, and the immediate causal effect is the TookOD it 
coefficient.
39 The identifying assumption seems reasonable given that survey topics are not pre-
announced and that we control for selection into survey-taking through the “any survey” 
variables. 
 
B. Main Results 
Table 4 presents results from our primary specifications. We build from simpler to richer 
specifications reading across columns. The first column includes only the overdraft survey 
variables. The next adds the “any survey” variables, including AnySurveysit linearly. Tests of the 
linearity restriction for both the overdraft and any survey stock variables do not reject linearity 
on the ODSurveys_Last2yrsit variable, but do reject linearity onAnySurveysit(column 3). The 
“any survey” stock variables are jointly significant and generally indicate that selection into 
survey-taking is positively correlated with incurring overdraft fees.
40 Column 4 adds controls for 
                                                 
37 We have also estimated the model with lagged values of the survey variables – one lag in some cases and several 
in others (up to a model omitting the parametric stock effects and including 24 lags of Took_OD and Took_Any). 
What we learn from those models is very similar qualitatively to what we learn from the more parsimonious models. 
38 We have also estimated specifications that control (flexibly) for the number of months a panelist has appeared in 
the panel. These variables are not significant and tend to reduce the precision of the estimates on the variables of 
interest. The “months-in-sample” variables are included (and significant) in some of the specifications we discuss 
later. 
39 Mechanically, the immediate effect is the sum of the coefficients on the two immediate survey variables, 
subtracting any bias from selection into surveys; i.e., the net effect is:  
40 The relationship between generic survey-taking and overdrafting is non-linear: there is little relationship until 
roughly the fifth survey, then the likelihood of overdrafting rises. For 7-12 generic surveys taken, the likelihood of 
overdrafting averages 5% higher than baseline. Results beyond that (13+ surveys) are noisy. 22 
 
other survey content (gift card, contactless card and auto loan questions). The coefficients on 
these variables are not significant and can be interpreted as a form of placebo test. Column 5 
adds measures of lagged overdrafting—the   AnyODi,t1 and Snowballi.t1 variables. Overall, the 
results are robust to variations in specification. The specification in column 5 is our preferred one 
for the rest of the analyses. 
We find significant immediate effects of taking an overdraft-related survey. In our preferred 
specification (column 5), the point estimate on the TookOD it coefficient is -0.037 (p-value 0.06) 
on a sample mean of 0.30, for the estimated reduction in the likelihood of overdrafting of 12% 
from its mean level. The point estimate on the immediate “any survey” coefficient is positive, 
with a p-value of 0.09. The lagged overdrafting coefficients are what one would expect given the 
very strong unconditional positive serial correlation documented in Table 1. 
We also find statistically strong and economically meaningful stock effects of taking multiple 
overdraft-related surveys. The point estimate in column 5 suggests that each overdraft survey 
taken in the last two years reduces the probability of overdrafting by 0.017. For a panelist taking 
three surveys, the cumulative effect is -0.051 on a mean of 0.30, which is a 17% decline.  
Table A5 provides more detail on the specification and dynamics of the stock effect. The first 
column is identical to that in Table 4, column 5 (we show only the stock effect variable). The 
second and third columns include linear specifications of the stock effect with faster decay (“OD 
surveys taken, last year”) and no decay (“OD surveys taken, ever”). The coefficients on these 
alternatively specified stock variables are smaller and not statistically significant. The fourth 
column includes all three variables; the two-year stock effect variable is significant, while the 
others are not.  
Table A5 columns 5-7 replace the linear stock variable with a set of indicators for number of 
surveys taken and also vary the stock horizon. Column 5 is of greatest interest, as it shows the 
unrestricted coefficients from the two-year stock effect specification. The linear specification 
seems to be a good approximation for the survey-by-survey stock effects, and one cannot reject 
the linear functional form restriction in any model. 
Together the results suggest that taking surveys with overdraft-related questions 
meaningfully reduces the likelihood of overdrafting in the short term and also leads to persistent 
but not permanent cumulative effects of having taken many surveys. Attention builds with 
survey-taking and decays over time. 23 
 
 
C. Effects on the Intensive Margin of Overdrafting? 
Table A6 specifies the dependent variable in several different ways: as an indicator equal to 
one if the panelist incurred 5+ overdraft fees, as the number of overdraft fees incurred, and as the 
level of overdraft fees incurred in dollars. In brief, the results show little support for a 
relationship between survey-taking and the intensive margin of overdrafting. It may be that 
attention to overdrafting is discrete or simply that our confidence intervals are wide (they do not 
rule out large reductions commensurate with what we find on the extensive margin). 
 
D. Sample Splits by Education, Income, and Financial Literacy 
Table 5 presents results from our preferred specification (Table 4, column 5), split across 
three panelist characteristics measured in the registration survey: education, financial literacy and 
income. Because of the noise that arises when splitting the sample too finely, we break the 
sample into two groups for each of the three baseline variables of interest here. The top row of 
the table reports sample means for the dependent variable for each group. Sample sizes vary 
across groups in this table, both because of the category break-points and because of missing 
data for some panelists (the financial literacy question, in particular, was asked only in a subset 
of registration surveys).  
The results in Table 5 show that the point estimates of treatment effect(s) are uniformly 
larger among those with less education (relative to more education), low/medium self-assessed 
financial literacy (relative to high), and lower income (relative to higher income). The lower 
groups do overdraw accounts more often on average, though not dramatically so, meaning that 
the proportional effects implied by the point estimates are also larger for these groups. For 
example, in the low-education subsample, the point estimates suggest that a panelist who has 
taken two surveys has the probability of overdrafting lowered by 0.044pp on a base of 0.290, a 
15% reduction. 
Evidence on whether the treatment effects differ significantly across the groups is weak. T-
tests reject equality only for the stock effect in the education split. Generally, the coefficient 
estimates are not precise enough for us to make sharper statements about how demographics are 
correlated with the effects of survey-taking. 24 
 
We can say with some conviction, however, that the treatment effects are substantial in the 
low-education, low-literacy and low-income subsamples. This is informative in itself, in that 
consumer advocates and some policymakers tend to focus on bank fees paid by those groups 
(see, e.g., http://www.overdrawnmovie.net/). 
 
E.  More Treatment Effects: Other Useful Variation in Survey Content 
Survey content varies in two other useful ways. As we mention above, one survey focuses 
entirely on overdrafts and potentially provides some information on prices and outside options. 
One might expect the “overdraft-focused” survey to have different effects than surveys that are 
merely “overdraft-mentioning.” Other useful variation in survey content comes from questions 
that are not precisely about overdrafts but which seem plausibly related in an associative way. 
We identify three categories of such questions (see footnote 20 for examples of question 
wording). One is spending control, since reducing spending is one way people can engineer 
overdraft reductions (see the next subsection). Another is monitoring of available checking 
account balances, given that closer monitoring of balances may be key to overdraft avoidance 
(see the next subsection). The third category is other bank fees, since overdraft fees represent the 
majority of bank fees paid by our panelists, raising the possibility that mentioning “bank fee” 
may trigger the thought of “overdraft fee” in the panelist’s mind.  
Table 6 presents results from models that allow for differences between overdraft-mentioning 
surveys and the overdraft-focused survey and that allow balance-/fee-/spending-mentioning 
surveys to affect overdrafting too. Column (1) adds the balance/fee/spending survey variables to 
our main specification (from Table 4, column 5). The immediate effect is not significant, but the 
stock effect is significant and comparable in point terms to the effect of overdraft-related surveys 
(compare to Table 4, column 5 and/or to the overdraft stock variables in this table). Column (2) 
relaxes the restriction that overdraft-mentioning and overdraft-focused surveys have identical 
effects. Their immediate effects are quite similar in point terms, but the stock effect of the 
overdraft-focused survey is much larger and significantly different from the stock effect of the 
overdraft-mentioning surveys. Column (3) refines the specification by restricting the “overdraft-
mentioning” and balance/fee/spending surveys to have identical stock effects. Column (4) 
maintains that restriction and also restricts the overdraft-mentioning and overdraft-focused 
surveys to have identical immediate effects, since these restrictions cannot be rejected. 25 
 
The upshot of this table is that variation in survey content seems to matter in an intuitive and 
associative way. The survey focused on overdrafts has a greater effect, at least in stock terms. 
Surveys about topics related to overdrafting also have meaningful stock effects. This result 
suggests that shocks to attention work in an associative way, cognitively speaking.  
 
F. Mechanisms: How People Engineer Overdraft Reductions  
If taking overdraft-related surveys induces less frequent overdrafting, how are panelists 
engineering those reductions? We address this question in Tables 7 and 8 by analyzing other 
measures of checking account usage as dependent variables, using our main specification for 
RHS variables except for changing the lagged dependent variable in accordance with the new 
LHS variables used here. We also control for tenure in the sample here by including a variable 
measuring “months in sample” and interacting that variable with the time period during which 
the panelist entered.
41 
The first dependent variable in Table 7 is the total number of monthly checking account 
spending transactions (column 1). The immediate effect on this variable of taking an overdraft-
related survey is negative (implying a 2% reduction) but insignificant. The stock effect is 
negative and implies a 4% reduction in the transaction count for each overdraft-mentioning 
survey taken within the last two years. Column 2 shows that we do not find a significant 
reduction in checking account spending in dollar terms (we use the log of spending to deal with 
skewness), although the confidence intervals do include substantial changes. 
Columns 3 and 4 show that the stock effect on spending transactions operates both when 
balances are quite close to the overdraft threshold (balance <$100) and when balances are higher 
(>=$100): panelists reduce transactions in both states.
42  (Note from column 7 that crossing the 
low-balance threshold is a common occurrence: 83% of panelist-months dip below a $100 
balance at some point.) The point estimate on low-balance transactions is larger in proportional 
terms, implying a 5% reduction (0.376/7.0) for each overdraft-mentioning survey taken, vs. a 3% 
reduction (1.428/41.5) for higher-balance transactions. 
Balances can be a choice variable too, and so we examine whether panelists take actions that 
are consistent with a strategy of increasing balances (e.g., maintaining a buffer stock) to avoid 
                                                 
41 These variables are significant in the models of Tables 7-8 but not in the overdraft models of Tables 4-6. 
42 We get similar results using other cutoffs such as $50 and $20. 26 
 
overdrafts. Column 5 shows no effects on the log of the dollar value of account credits (deposits 
and transfers into the account). Columns 6 and 7 show that the likelihood of reaching a low-
balance threshold (<$100) does not change following overdraft-related survey-taking. 
In all, Table 7 suggests that panelists engineer overdraft reductions by reducing spending 
transactions (i.e., by managing outflows) but not by increasing inflows. 
Table 8 looks at the composition of spending transactions. Columns 1 and 3 show significant 
and negative stock effects on both debit card and autodebit (ACH) transactions. These results 
seem intuitive given that balances-at-clearing are relatively hard to monitor and manage for both 
types of transactions (although the same could be said of checks, and we do not find a significant 
result there). These results also suggest that consumers may use a mix (within and/or across 
people) of high-frequency and low-frequency vigilance to avoid overdrafts: reducing debit card 
use may well involve a series of decisions to not pull out the card, whereas an automatic debit 
can be cancelled (and the bill switched to manual pay) with a single phone call or web log-in. 
We do not find significant effects on checks, cash withdrawals, or paydown of credit card 
balances (for credit cards we use dollar value rather than transaction count, since credit cards 
require at least one payment per month), although the point estimate on the stock variable is 
negative in each case. 
In all, Table 8 suggests that people respond to overdraft surveys by managing spending 
transactions more intensively on multiple margins. Whether this heterogeneity in response to 
attention shocks occurs within-person (i.e., a given person implements multiple strategies) or 
across-person (different people respond differently) is not something we can pin down. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Overdraft fees became an increasingly important source of consumer outlays and bank 
profits over the 2000s. Our results suggest that limited consumer attention plays an important 
role in explaining overdrafts. 
We find that consumer overdrafting drops sharply after taking surveys that mention 
overdrafts or topics that consumers might associate with overdrafts: spending control, balance-
monitoring, or other bank fees. Plausibly unrelated survey content (on auto loans, gift cards, and 
contactless cards) does not affect overdrafts. The overdraft surveys have an immediate (same-
month) effect and a stock (long-run) effect: attention is built via survey-taking and decays slowly 27 
 
over time. The stock effect is stronger from the one overdraft-focused survey than from the other 
surveys that merely mention overdrafts. These effects exist even among the less well-educated 
and financially literate, an important finding if one wants to target those groups with an 
attention-based treatment. We find strong effects on the extensive margin (paying any overdraft 
fee in a given month) only, not on the intensive margin (fee amount paid, conditional on paying a 
fee). Consumers implement overdraft fee reductions by reducing spending transactions on debit 
cards and autodebits (ACH), suggesting a combination of high-frequency and low-frequency 
vigilance on transactions where the balance at the time of transaction clearing is difficult to 
monitor/forecast. We do not find evidence that consumers respond to the shocks by increasing 
balances in their checking account. 
Our results suggest an important role in household finance for limited consumer attention 
that is dynamic, associative, and malleable. The surveys we examine do not provide any direct 
and panelist-specific information about account terms, meaning that the effects we observe are, 
in principle, distinct from those one would observe following classic disclosure of account terms. 
Our results raise some provocative new questions for policy. Might more subtle approaches 
to drawing attention or conveying information complement, or even substitute for, more standard 
and direct approaches like information disclosure? Mandated disclosure typically focuses on the 
one-time, up-front provision of information, and our results suggest that this approach may have 
only a temporary effect on consumer behavior.
43 Ongoing messaging might be more useful in 
helping consumers attend to their household finances. If so, who should and will provide such 
messaging? These questions merely skim the surface of the possibilities for further research on 
limited attention, household finance, and consumer financial protection. 
 
  
                                                 
43 Stango and Zinman (2011) highlight the enforcement challenges involved in mandated disclosure in consumer 
lending. Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2008) make a similar point regarding mandated default options; the lender 
“moves last” and has incentives to get the consumer to undo the default (e.g., “just initial here” to opt in to standard 
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